Burlesque and Camden

There’s been some outcry in the last few days about Camden Council halting burlesque shows at Proud Galleries and demanding the venue apply for the same kind of licensing strip and lapdance venues require.

The main responses to this I see, over and over again, hinge on the opposition that burlesque performances are primarily artistic, rather than sexual. But look a little bit closer at this distinction and I fail to see an opposition between artistry and sexuality at all, more a question of the dignity of the respective performances.

I have been worried recently by the lack of satire I’ve seen in burlesque shows – good-looking girls taking their glamorous clothes off may be aesthetically pleasing, but doesn’t strike me as remotely subversive. It offends me that burlesque has been dignified in a way that stripping hasn’t – it’s OK if the classy girls do it, but sluts? Ew, let’s keep that out of our borough.

So go ahead and support the burlesque dancers of Camden, but think carefully about how acceptable and artistic you think women packaging up their bodies for sale is. If we’re going to allow burlesque onto our streets then we’re going to have to accept less salubrious venues too. Burlesque is just the glamorous public face of a questionable industry.

No to ID

Torture Garden win compromise on SEOne ID issue

I still don’t want to go to that venue until they stop the ID madness altogether (and stop charging for a wristband to go outside and smoke), though I’m now pondering whether another effective protest would be to apply for one’s information under data protection and give them busywork to bring the issue to their attention. (This tactic I think has potential to be used as a legal form of disobedience in other areas as well – eg. CCTV cameras)

Kettling: Is it Legal?

I haven’t yet formulated all of my thoughts about last week’s G20 protests (as I’ve been too busy at work… I am such a bad communist) but a barrister friend of mine, J Bide-Thomas, wrote an interesting piece on the legality of kettling that some may find useful:

“The short answer is that kettling is legal.

The recent decision of the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords in the case of Austin and another v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2009] UKHL 5 considered the case of two persons that were contained by the police on 1st May 2001 in an area containing approximately 3,000 other people for a period of 7 hours. The principal question for the Court to decide was whether or not, on the facts found by the judge at first instance (High Court), there was a breach of article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the relevant part of which is:

Article 5(1)

12. Article 5(1) of the Convention provides:

“Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:

(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;

(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;

(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;

This article provides that nobody shall be deprived of their liberty except where the article permits. In the instant case, the Court examined the wording of both article 5 and also the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence on similar cases. The House of Lords came to the conclusion that none of the previous cases were terribly similar. Note that the House of Lords was not asked to look at the facts as found by the judge in the High Court. Some of these findings seem to me to be reasonable and others are absurd. They include:

‘The cordon was imposed purely for crowd control purposes, to protect people and property from injury;

The cordon was necessary as many of the demonstrators were bent on violence and impeding the police, and its imposition was in no way attributable to policing failures;

The purpose and reason for imposing the cordon were at all times plain to those constrained within it; (Really?)

The cordon lasted for as short a time as possible; during its imposition, the police attempted to raise it on a number of occasions, but decided that it was impractical;

Those who were not demonstrators, or were seriously affected by being confined, were promptly permitted to leave; (Untrue)

The appellant knew in advance that many of the demonstrators intended to cause violence, and that the police were concerned about this. (irrelevant)

The House of Lords based their judgment on those facts. They compared the situation at a protest with football matches, the closure of a carriageway following an accident and forcing people away from a location where there is a gunman. They came to the conclusion that:

1. A pragmatic approach was required in relation to article 5 rights. It was necessary to balance the rights of individuals against the important objectives of protecting people from injury and property from damage. The strict wording of article 5 suggests that it had to be necessary to stop the detained person from committing crime. A pragmatic approach was needed in a public order situation. People could be kettled to prevent disorder by other people contained within the kettle. It was not possible to distinguish between the peaceful and the violent in such a situation.

2. The nature of the Police actions on the 1st May 2001 did not amount to a breach of the article 5 rights of those contained within the cordon. There was no ‘detention.’

3. Kettling will not amount to a breach of article five as long as:

a) The actions of the police are proportionate and reasonable;
b) The containment is for the shortest amount of time possible;
c) The tactic is required to prevent serious disorder and violence.

My view is that there is still considerable scope for courts in the future finding that although in theory there is nothing wrong with kettling, the particular circumstance did not justify the technique. If there is no danger of serious disorder then kettling is likely to be inappropriate. I’m aware that there is currently an appeal from this decision going to the ECHR. Don’t hold your breath!

The problems that I have with the judgment are:

1. The facts as found by the judge in the High Court;
2. The suggestion that people ought to avoid protests where there might be troublemakers;
3. The suggestion that ‘non-protesters’ were allowed to leave: why? Surely a non-violent protester should have just as much right to leave the kettle as a by-stander?
4. The judge at first instance failed to take into account the fact that the situation inside the kettle was to a large extent the creation of the police. I suspect that the majority of people within it were not initially antagonistic towards the police but were made so by the kettle (what are kettles famous for, people? That’s right, boiling!)

Why did the judges reach the decision that they did?

1. Something very similar to kettling is currently used at football matches. Making it impossible to hold people to prevent disorder would destroy current methods of preventing disorder at football matches.
2. Danger of opening the floodgates to all 3,000 of the people at the Mayday protests bringing actions against the police.
3. Innate conservatism and a desire for public order.

Useful quote?

Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury

‘If it transpired, for instance, that the police had maintained the cordon, beyond the time necessary for crowd control, in order to punish, or “to teach a lesson” to, the demonstrators within the cordon, then it seems to me that very different considerations would arise. In such circumstances, I would have thought that there would have been a powerful argument for saying that the maintenance of the cordon did amount to a detention within the meaning of article 5. However, as is apparent from the clear and careful findings made by the Judge, which have quite rightly not been challenged on appeal, there could be no question of such a contention being raised in the present case.’”

Bin Britain

Say no to totalitarianism, surveillance and the advent of control society – say no to Bin Britain!

in soviet russia, art looks at you

The Defining Constructivism: Rodchenko and Popova exhibition at Tate Modern was super. Constructivism is refreshing to look at as it doesn’t have an unconscious, no dangerous and poisoned depths, just force and impact; explicit, materialist. It’s an interesting exhibition to move through historically also, as a narrative caught up in world events unfolds through the pieces.
It starts with painting, of which Popova’s paintings are superior, with more movement and dynamism. Many of the paintings are on wood, the rough grain peeks through. Having decided that painting is reactionary and of no use in Soviet Russia, the paintings become studies for buildings and machines, and interestingly we note that they have much more impact as studies than as the reconstructed 3D models – the pictures have temporality, where you can see the dynamism of the machine, whereas the models look all still and unnecessary. The real point of synthesis is the room with the graphic design – instead of art pieces for galleries, we find book covers, fabrics, posters. (And of course, the logical extension of constructing art & design for everyday life in Socialist Russia is that you can buy Constructivist fridge magnets in the shop). The final room is a reproduction of Rodchenko’s design for a workers living space – a room with very little furniture (so no one would let it get dirty or cluttered… the short sight of modernism!) and just a few books and a chess set. We are shocked by the inclusion of the hierarchist game of chess! (Surely backgammon is a more properly Marxist game?) Chris and I play chess. He wins.

non-philosophy [work in progress]

This morning’s interweb meanderings take me around the subjects of speculative realism and nonphilosophy: Meillasoux, Toscano, Brassier and Laruelle, and I have a few [extremely superficial] first impressions:

Meillasoux has been mentioned several times in classes this year, but I was hindered in looking him up in that I couldn’t work out how his name was spelled. My French is less improved than I thought!

We reach the point of non-philosophy proper with <a href=”http://www.radicalphilosophy.com/default.asp?channel_id=2188&editorial_id=13668″>Laruelle</a>. At this point I’m unsure whether I want to continue my investigation; am I really interested in non-philosophy? It operates in a way that is constitutively incomprehensible to philosophy. Or does it? It seems the options are to be a failure and be another philosophy, or to succeed and lose my philosophical interest. (Having only read second-hand accounts I couldn’t possibly comment at this stage).

Thinking about these types of (non/)philosophies brings to mind the contradictory nature of philosophical space. Theories emerge out of those they are least like. There is more violent disagreement between philosophies that are similar. The terrain turns over on itself. Points unexpectedly repel you to the opposite end of the universe

At the moment I’m getting the feeling that it’s a bit like a musical style like breakcore or post-rock and they’re just trying to be difficult and perverse.

[Edit] Chris corresponds with me about it, and is more optimistic of its uses [he's a religious studies student]

That’s the point, which is certainly a challenge.  Although I would suggest it’s more of a challenge to the academy than to “philosophy” (small “p”) and they are not hermeneutically identical as witnessed by, for example, [name removed]‘s cult who are clearly doing “philosophy” even if it takes place beyond the pale of Modern Academic Philosophy.

I think its bound to stir up strong feelings because it clearly pre-imposes itself as a precedent epistemological step, not (directly) superseding or refuting anything, but rather demoting everything.  It is obviously very problematic for lots of Continental Philosophy because its necessarily transcendental and seems to discount the possibility of (my very limited understanding of) immanence.

I must confess I find it attractive because of the mystico-religious and philosophical religious implications, with the Trancendental Axiomatic as grace/revelation subsequently acted on by the intellect.